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Case study Case study 2. 6 questions need to be answered CASE STUDY TWO Title: Dividend Policy at Fuyao Glass Use the following link to access

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Case study
Case study 2. 6 questions need to be answered

CASE STUDY TWO

Title: Dividend Policy at Fuyao Glass

Use the following link to access the Case assigned:

https://hbsp.harvard.edu/import/668672.

Case Synopsis

The case concerns dividend policy at Fuyao Glass Industry Group, Ltd., the leading manufacturer of auto glass in China and the worlds second-largest manufacturer of auto glass (early 2015). Fuyao was controlled by Cho Tak Wong, a man of humble, rural origins with little formal education, whose success came from business acumen, a strong service ethic, commitment to lifelong learning, industry focus, and good fortune.

Cho had been recognized as a leading philanthropist (2010) and EY Entrepreneur of the Year (2008 China). Fuyao had relatively modest cash balances but strong cash flows. Domestically, the company had little opportunity for investment, but Cho wished to become the leading auto-glass company in the world, so Fuyao was getting ready to enter production in both the United States and Russia. To raise the required capital, Fuyao was scheduling a global initial public offering (IPO) of its shares in Hong Kong (2015).

Cho had to decide, in early 2015, the size of its dividend distribution and whether Fuyao should change its residual, fluctuating dividend policy in light of it IPO.

Case study learning objectives

The role of dividends in corporate finance
How dividend policy affects the value of a company and the wealth of shareholders
How to make a dividend decision based on analysis of financial statements, pro forma statements, capital structure, and dividend policies
How to interpret the effect of leadership style on corporate performance and value.

Major Case Questions:

1. To what extent is Fuyao a value creator or a value destroyer, and what are the potential sources of that creation (or destruction)?

2. Is dividend policy irrelevant to Fuyao? If so, why? If not, why not?

3. Project Fuyaos cash flows for the next year under the conditions of dividend decrease, maintenance, and increase, using end-period cash balances or short-term borrowing as the plug. How do assumptions about operating cash flows, capital structure, and IPO proceeds affect the dividend policy decision?

4. How do regulatory concerns, signaling to future investors in the upcoming IPO, and shareholder preferences affect Fuyaos dividend decision?

5. How has Chos leadership affected the value of the company and the dividend policy of Fuyao?

6. Take the position of a Fuyao board member. Propose a dividend payout and future policy. Defend your proposal in light of your answers for questions 1 through 4. In a discussion that includes group members taking on the roles of other board members, come to a board decision on dividend policy. W16725

DIVIDEND POLICY AT FUYAO GLASS

Hugh Thomas, Joyce L. Wang, and Yuhui Wu wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not
intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names
and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.

This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights
organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western
University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) [emailprotected]; www.iveycases.com.

Copyright 2016, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation Version: 2016-11-09

In early February 2015, Dr. Zuo Min, the chief financial officer of Fuyao Glass Industry Group., Ltd.
(Fuyao), was drafting a dividend policy to be discussed at the meeting of Fuyaos board of directors in
two weeks time. Fuyao was Chinas largestand the worlds second largestmanufacturer of
automotive glass (auto glass) in terms of 2013 sales revenues. The company had completed its domestic
initial public offering (IPO) on the Shanghai Stock Exchange on June 10, 1993, when it became the first
listed auto-glass manufacturer in China. Fuyao was preparing for a global IPO on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange in March 2015. Zuo expected that this global IPO would yield more than 5.3 billion1
(approximately US$850 million) in cash that the company could pour into its accounts.

Zuo had served Fuyao in various capacities since he joined the company in 1989, and he had provided
input on decisions concerning Fuyaos generous dividend payout policies. However, Fuyao was preparing
to expand into the global market, a strategy that would require a huge capital investment, and Zuo knew
very well that the support of Mr. Cho Tak Wong, founder and chairman of the company, would be a
critical factor in the boards decision making. Cho and the other directors would need to know the cash
projections of Fuyao in terms of its operations, expansion policy, capital structure, and dividend payout,
and they would want to know how those factors meshed with Fuyaos strategy and philosophy.

INDUSTRY BACKGROUND

The global auto-glass market in 2015 was divided into two major segments: the original equipment
manufacturers (OEM) market, which included glass sold to automobile manufacturers for installation on
new vehicles; and the aftersales replacement glass (ARG) market for vehicle repairs. Global demand for
auto glass increased from 294 million square metres in 2009 to 415 million square metres in 2013. Roland
Berger, an automobile industry consulting company, projected that global demand for auto glass would

1 = CNY = Chinese yuan renminbi; all amounts are in unless otherwise specified; US$1.00 = 6.25 on February 1, 2015.
Expected IPO proceeds were based on the issuance of 440 million shares, total fees and expenses of 5 per cent of the
issuance, and an offer price of 12.68 per share. Actual proceeds would differ from expectations.

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Page 2 9B16N059

increase to 528 million square metres in 2018. This increase would driven primarily by the economic
recovery in the United States and Europe and the growing demand for automobiles in the emerging
economies of Asia and South America.2

The global auto-glass market was highly concentrated. In 2013, four top playersAsahi Glass Co., Ltd.
(AGC), Fuyao, Nippon Sheet Glass Co., Ltd. (NSG), and Saint-Gobainaccounted for approximately 77
per cent of the global market in terms of sales revenue. Fuyaos sales represented 20 per cent of the total
global auto-glass sales, right after AGC, which was number one with 22 per cent of the total global glass
market. Among Fuyaos three international competitors, Saint-Gobain was the largest in terms of revenue,
but glass (including auto glass) made up only half of Saint-Gobains Innovative Materials Divisions
revenues and just a quarter of Saint-Gobains total revenues. About three-quarters of Saint-Gobains
revenues came from the manufacture and distribution of other building materials. About half of AGCs
sales were glass-related (including flat glass, auto glass, and display glass), with the rest of its sales made
up of electronics, chemicals, and ceramics. In contrast, almost all of NSGs revenues were glass-related,
with about half from auto glass, 40 per cent from construction glass, and 10 per cent from technical
glass.3 Unlike its competitors, Fuyao specialized exclusively in auto-glass production.

The Chinese domestic auto-glass market was also highly concentrated, with approximately 89 per cent of
Chinas auto-glass sales made by the top five domestic manufacturers (three of which were Chinese
subsidiaries of Fuyaos international competitors) and 10 per cent by imports. The domestic market was
expected to grow from 96.5 million square metres in 2013 to 150.6 million square metres in 2018.4 Fuyao
was the largest domestic player (63 per cent market share), followed by AGC (12 per cent), Saint-Gobain
(9 per cent), Xinyi (7 per cent), and NSG (4 per cent).

High entry barriers into the auto-glass industry explained industry concentration in both the global and
domestic markets. First, it was very difficult to quickly establish manufacturing and sales networks
covering major automobile producers. These networks were crucial as a cost-effective way to meet OEM
and ARG markets. Second, the advanced technology requirements for the production of safe,
multifunctional auto glass presented barriers to potential entrants that had poor research and development
(R & D) capabilities. Third, any new entrant would have to make large capital investments to establish an
auto-glass manufacturing facility and ensure supplies of float glass. Fuyao had already invested in its own
high-quality float glass production lines located near each of its auto-glass manufacturing facilities. Last
but not least, automobile manufacturers required that the auto glass they installed should possess the
safety and quality certifications prescribed by each of the countries and regions where their cars would be
sold. Fuyaos auto glass already had such certification.

The auto-glass industry was experiencing several new trends. Sunroofs were becoming increasingly
popular, and enhancements were being made in both the size and tilt angle of the front windshield. Each
of these trends increased glass area per vehicle. Customers expected more value-added features and
functions to improve driving comfort, safety, and energy efficiency, and many of these traits were being
built into auto glass. In order to better control costs, optimize supply chains, and enhance quality control,

2 Fuyao Glass Industry Group Limited Global Offering, Fuyao Glass, March 19, 2015, 119, accessed April 13, 2015,
www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2015/0319/LTN20150319019.pdf, hereinafter Prospectus. In the Prospectus,
filed with Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, Fuyao reported that it obtained the forecasts from a privately commissioned
study issued by Roland Berger Enterprise Management (Shanghai) Co. in preparation for the offering.
3 Saint-Gobain, 2015 Registration Document, accessed October 14, 2016, www.saint-
gobain.com/sites/sgcom.master/files/sg_drf2015_gb.pdf; AGC Group, AGC Report 2015, accessed October 14, 2016,
www.agc.com/english/csr/book/pdf/agc_report_2015e.pdf; NSG Group, Annual Report 2015: Fiscal Year Ended 31 March
2015, accessed October 14, 2016,
www.nsg.com/~/media/NSG/Site%20Content/Temporary%20Downloads/English/AR2015.ashx.
4 Prospectus, 88.

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Page 3 9B16N059

auto-glass manufacturers, in close cooperation with the OEMs, modularized their products so the auto
glass could be installed quickly on autobodies as they travelled along the OEMs assembly lines.5

COMPANY BACKGROUND

On June 20, 1987, Fuyao was established as a Sino-foreign equity joint venture6 under the name of Fujian
Yaohua Industrial Glass Co., Ltd., with a registered capital of 6.27 million. At that time, a township
enterprise7 called the Fuqing County Gaoshan Special Shaped Glass Factory held a 25 per cent equity
interest in Fuyao, and Fuyao was managed by Cho under a contract from the county. Since that time,
Fuyaos ownership structure and management had changed several times, but effective control had
remained in Chos hands (see Exhibit 1).

Fuyaos products were sold in the domestic Chinese and overseas markets. Its major customers included
the worlds top 20 automobile manufacturers and Chinas top 10 passenger vehicle manufacturers. The
average age of its business relationship with its top 10 customers was 10 years, and those customers
engineers cooperated closely with Fuyao, from the early planning stages through to the manufacturing of
each new models auto-glass needs. Fuyaos 12 auto-glass production bases in China enabled the
company to offer cost-effective, just-in-time domestic delivery. Vertical integration into float glass
provided a stable, high-quality glass supply. High operational efficiency further contributed to Fuyaos
significant cost competitiveness. In addition, by using a flexible manufacturing system, the company
could respond quickly to market changes and could manufacture auto glass in small batches.

Fuyao expanded internationally by establishing subsidiaries in Hong Kong, the United States, South
Korea, Germany, Japan, and Russia, thereby raising international sales in 2012, 2013, and 2014 to 32.6
per cent, 32.0 per cent, and 33.5 per cent of total revenue, respectively. By late 2014, after the completion
of an auto-glass production facility in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, China, management at Fuyao
considered that further domestic production expansion would be pointless. Instead, any future production
expansion would be largely international. As of early 2015, Fuyao had an auto-glass production facility in
Kaluga City, Russia, which it was expanding; completion of that expansion was scheduled for the fourth
quarter of 2016. Although Russia was the second-largest automobile market in Europe, Fuyaos
management considered that Russias uncertain economy and currency could increase the volatility of
Fuyaos profit.

Besides its Russian facility, Fuyao was also establishing an auto-glass manufacturing plant in the U.S.
state of Ohio, which was expected to be completed by December 2015. The companys expansion into the
United States was driven by customers (e.g., Honda and BMW) demand for just-in-time delivery and by
the cost advantages that could be achieved as a result of considerably lower energy costs, transportation
costs, and import tariffs.

To ensure timely supplies of float glass, Fuyao planned to construct two float glass production lines near
its Russian facility and to retrofit and upgrade its two float glass production lines in the U.S. state of
Illinois, which it had purchased in August 2014. U.S. banking and financial services company J. P.
Morgan estimated that Fuyao could reduce its selling costs for auto glass by about 3 to 4 per cent by

5 Industry Overview, Prospectus, 867.
6 A Sino-foreign equity joint venture is a limited liability company formed by a Chinese company and a foreign company in
Chinese territory. Foreign companies typically put up at least a quarter of the total investment, while there is no minimum
investment requirement for Chinese companies.
7 Township enterprises, owned initially by communes and later by townships, were set up in the 1980s as part of the initial
reforms associated with the opening up and reforming of the Chinese economy after the Cultural Revolution.

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Page 4 9B16N059

producing in the United States. At the same time, Fuyao could achieve a significant increase in sales
revenues from the U.S. market.8 The company intended to continue its long-term policy of constructing
overseas manufacturing bases to meet global demand (see Exhibit 2), subject to understanding the local
environments and regulations.

Fuyao had two R & D centres in China and one each in Germany and the United States. These facilities
allowed Fuyao to co-design and develop auto glass that could fit with customers product development
cycles, thus enabling Fuyao to produce customized auto glass for each new model produced by its
customers. As a result, the company was able to help its customers address potential manufacturing or
design problems, and customer relationships were strengthened in the process. As a way to differentiate
itself from its competitors, Fuyao prioritized R & D on high value-added products, introducing auto glass
for environmental friendliness, low energy consumption, smart digital capabilities, and modularized
features.

Fuyaos main competitors in the global market, headquartered in Japan (AGC and NSG) and France
(Saint-Gobain), had limited presence in Eastern Europe. In 2010, in Russia, AGC built the worlds largest
float glass furnace and, in 2015, it acquired an ARG auto-glass plant in Poland. Saint-Gobain produced
flat glass and construction materials and had an R & D centre in Russia, but the company performed no
auto-glass production there. In 2006, NSG acquired the major British glass company, Pilkington Glass,
and had a float glass production facility in Russia, but no auto-glass production. In North America,
however, both AGC and NSG had substantial auto-glass manufacturing presences dating back to the
1990s, while Saint-Gobain had an ARG presence.9

COMPANY STRATEGY

Fuyaos goal was to solidify its dominant position in China and become the most competitive auto-glass
manufacturer in the world. The company planned to strengthen its relationships with OEMs through
offering more high-quality products and services and building more satellite facilities near its OEM
customers so that products and services could be provided in a cost-effective and timely manner.
Management planned to set up more sales offices and representative offices, and recruit global talent
whenever strategic opportunities arose. Fuyao was committed to increasing R & D spending, offering
better just-in-time delivery, implementing cost-control measures, streamlining production processes, and
increasingly using automation to further reduce costs and increase profitability.

FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE10

Fuyaos revenue was 10.25 billion in 2012, 11.50 billion in 2013, and 12.93 billion in 2014. Net
profits earned were 1.52 billion in 2012, 1.92 billion in 2013, and 2.22 billion in 2014. As of
December 31, 2014, Fuyao had cash and cash equivalents of 499.1 million (see Exhibits 3 and 4). The

8 Nick Lai, Leon Chik, Rebecca Y. Wen, and Liwen Yin, J. P. Morgan: Fuyao Glass Industry GroupH, Crystal Clear
FutureInitiate with OW, Asia Pacific Equity Research, May 5, 2015, accessed May 15, 2015, www.niuniuwang.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/H3_AP201603220014021313_01.pdf.
9 Russia, Ukraine, CIS Countries, Saint-Gobain, accessed August 1, 2016, www.saint-gobain.com/en/russia-ukraine-cis-
countries; AGC Our Story, AGC Asahi Glass, accessed August 1, 2016,
www.agc.com/english/company/history/history.html. For a report on the NSG acquisition of Pilikington, see L. Saigol, K.
Suzuki, and D. Turner, NSG and Pilkington in 2.2bn Deal, Financial Times, February 28, 2006, accessed August 1, 2016;
www.ft.com/content/439a720c-a563-11da-bf34-0000779e2340. For information on NSG see NSG Group Worldwide, NSG
Group, accessed August 1, 2016, www.nsg.com/en/about-nsg/nsggroupworldwide.
10 Financial Information, Prospectus, 184230.

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Page 5 9B16N059

company planned capital expenditures of 2.99 billion and 3.01 billion in 2015 and 2016, respectively,
mainly to construct new auto glass and float glass manufacturing facilities in overseas markets and to
upgrade any existing facilities (see Exhibit 5). Fuyao would take advantage of additional global auto-glass
investment opportunities when they arose. Other than capital expenditure, Fuyao expected to use 523.5
million to increase its working capital in 2015.

Cash flow that would be made available for new investments and to pay out dividends would come from
the combined effects of operations, selling of assets, and raising and retiring of debt and equity. The
proportion of debt in the desired capital structure of Fuyao therefore affected the dividend policy. Cho
had frequently told Zuo his opinion of capital structure:

I think that if you are running a company and dont use debt, you are an idiot. You should use
debt. So how much is reasonable? Less than 50 per cent is reasonable. Some are more
conservative. They say less than 30 per cent is a little better. I think that less than 50 per cent is
no problem. Our products are special. Our cash flow is adequate. There is no problem.

Fuyaos debt ratio as of the end of 2014 was similar to AGCs and Xinyis, but lower than NSGs and
Saint-Gobains (see Exhibit 4). Fuyaos debt consisted primarily of bank loans, medium-term notes, and
commercial paper (see Exhibit 6). Since its inception, Fuyao had never experienced obstacles in raising
new debt. As of January 31, 2015, the company had the right to draw on pre-approved bank-loan funding
in the amount of 13.17 billion without fulfilling any additional conditions.

Cho expressed pride in his relationships with the banks and his confidence that reasonable payouts of
dividends could be easily financed:

If we had to come up suddenly with one or two billion renminbi [for dividend payments], we
could retain revenues and not pay expenses for two months . . . but of course we dont do it that
way. When we dont have the money to pay out dividends, we borrow it from the bank. When we
have the money, we return it.

Fuyao usually received payments from customers within three months after delivery of products. Its OEM
customers generally contracted without minimum-purchase obligations, and some of them even
contracted with alternative suppliers at the same time. As a result, unexpected delays in payment or
termination of contracts could adversely affect Fuyaos operational and financial conditions. In order to
avoid any cash shortages caused by these risks, Fuyao targeted a cash balance of 4 per cent of annual
sales.

Although Fuyao had strong debt-financing abilities, one of the reasons for planning to issue its shares on
the Hong Kong Exchange in March 2015 was to fund the companys global expansion in a way that
would not be entirely debt-financed. Fuyao management considered that a reasonable equity cushion
would reduce liquidity risk.

Management had decided on an offshore listing in Hong Kong rather than a subsequent primary offering
(SPO) of A-shares in Shanghai because an international listing would reduce the inconveniences caused
by foreign exchange controls in China and would also increase international investors access to Fuyao
shares. Hong Kong was the preferred choice of mainland issuers seeking offshore listings; in fact,
mainland shares accounted for over half the value of shares traded on the Hong Kong Exchange. Another
reason that Fuyaos financial advisors chose a global IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange rather than
a Shanghai SPO involved the investors tastes: Chinese domestic investors were keener on growth stocks

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Page 6 9B16N059

than were international investors. The international investors placed greater value on companies like
Fuyao that had a steady performance and a stable and rising dividend payout.

DIVIDEND POLICY

Since its domestic A-share IPO in 1992, Fuyao had implemented stock dividends on seven occasions,
issued primary shares in an SPO, conducted two rights issues, and increased share capital on three
occasions through conversions of capital reserves.11

Concerning cash dividends, Fuyaos articles of association endeavoured to

pay dividends out of our after-tax profit only after we have made the following allocations:
recovery of accumulated losses from previous years, if any; allocations to statutory reserve fund
of 10 per cent of our after-tax profit until the amount in the statutory reserve fund reaches 50 per
cent of our registered capital; and allocations to a discretionary reserve fund.

Fuyaos articles of association also stated its intention to distribute cash dividends of at least 20 per cent
of its distributable profits each year unless it expected to make significant investment or incur significant
capital expenditures in the following year.12

The company declared cash dividends of 1.01 billion for 2012 and 2013, representing 0.5 per A-Share
(see Exhibit 7). Fuyao management considered that shareholders appreciated dividends and observed that
Fuyaos stock price typically went up around the time when management announced that it would pay
such dividends. Cho commented:

Fuyaos projected cash flow is extremely stable. Thats why I could boastfully distribute 50 per
cent of profits without a care. If I didnt distribute it, it would have to go to pay back the bank, but
that is not a good deal. The company belongs to the shareholders. Why not use debt? Debt has
several advantages: (1) the interest cost of debt is a pre-tax expense, so it is tax deductible; (2) all
countries have adopted [a] loose monetary policy, printing money like theres no limit; (3) from
an investors point of view, we should enjoy the returns of our investment, distribute back a little
profit, take it easy for a bit. Thats the way it is.

Since the turn of the century, Chinese securities regulators, concerned about the low dividend payout rate
of many listed firms, promulgated various guidelines to encourage companies to pay cash dividends or
justify non-cash dividends (see Exhibit 8).

Zou was aware that Cho was in favour of paying dividends, having once heard the chairman say:

I also like money. I work myself half to death, but [if I] dont declare dividends, where can I get
money from? I work here as the chairman, but my salary is very little. Every year, I only make a
few tens of thousands of U.S. dollars. Its only enough for my own expenses. But what about my
wife and kids?

11 A stock dividend gives holders of existing shares additional shares in proportion to their existing holdings. A rights issue
gives existing shareholders the right but not the obligation to purchase additional shares. The strike price of the rights issue
is typically set at a discount to the current share price.
12 Dividend Policy, Prospectus, 227.

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Page 7 9B16N059

Besides Cho, Fuyao had one other major shareholder: the Heren Charitable Foundation. Cho, a
conscientious Buddhist, had set up the Heren Foundation in 2011, donating to it 14.48 per cent of the
shares of Fuyao. The foundation served as a vehicle through which Cho could direct his considerable
charitable activities. With that donation, Cho became the foremost philanthropist in China.13 Did the cash
flow needs of such a large shareholder enter into the dividend decision-making of Fuyao? Cho
commented:

In my heart, the most important thing is the Fuyao Group. This is my lifeblood, my work. I set up
the Heren Foundation with a donation. The Chinese people said that I contributed 3.5 billion.
My stock at the time I donated it was worth 3.5 billion. If the foundation needs money, it can
sell stock. I have no undertaking to assure that it receives dividends.

As Zuo turned his thoughts to the board briefing paper that he needed to write for recommending a
dividend policy, his mind shifted back to Fuyaos upcoming global IPO. Clearly, whatever policy he
chose to advocate should also accord with the tastes of the new international investors.

13 Lydia Chen, Charity Receives Massive Donation, Shanghai Daily, April 14, 2011, accessed March 16, 2016,
www.fuyaogroup.com.hk/download/Charity%20receives%20massive%20donation.pdf.

Hugh Thomas is an associate professor at CUHK Business School, The Chinese University of Hong Kong;
Joyce L. Wang is a lecturer at CUHK Business School, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; and Yuhui Wu
is an associate professor at the School of Management, Xiamen University.

The authors wish to express their gratitude for financing provided by the Victor and William Fung Foundation
to the Fung Service Leadership Initiative, the China National Natural Science Funds [Project No. 71372072],
and the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University [Project No. NCET-13-0507].

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Page 8 9B16N059

EXHIBIT 1: FUYAOS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AS OF JANUARY 31, 2015

Note: Heren Charitable Foundations highest decision-making body was its council, which, in 2015, comprised nine
members, including Mr. Cho Tak Wongs brother, Mr. Cao Degan, and two non-executive directors of Fuyao. Sanyi, Home
Bridge, and Yaohua were 100 per cent directly and indirectly owned by Mr. Cho Tak Wong and his wife, Ms. Chan Fung
Ying.

Source: Fuyao Glass Industry Group Limited Global Offering, HKEX News, March 19, 2015, accessed April 13, 2015,
www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2015/0319/LTN20150319019.pdf.

100%

100%

100%

0.02%

Heren Charitable
Foundation

14.48%

Sanyi 19.50%

Chopline
Limited

Yaohua 1.71%

Other Holders of
A-Shares

63.69%

Cho Tak
Wong

The
Company

Home
Bridge

0.60%

99.99%

Chan Fung
Ying

0.01%

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Page 9 9B16N059

EXHIBIT 2: PRODUCTION CAPACITY, UTILIZATION, AND EXPANSION PLANS

Float Glass Auto Glass

capacity (thousands of tonnes)

utilization (%)
capacity (thousands of tonnes)

utilization (%)

Existing Facilities 2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014

China

Northern China

Capacity 395.0 199.0 230.0 24.7 23.1 27.1

Utilization 93.7 94.0 73.0 77.5 91.3 77.9

Central and Eastern China

Capacity – – – 23.5 28.6 33.1

Utilization – – – 86.4 87.1 85.5

Southern China

Capacity 474.0 474.0 500.0 29.6 30.7 35.0

Utilization 94.3 92.8 87.8 82.1 90.6 88.3

Southwestern China

Capacity 281.0 341.0 328.0 14.2 14.2 15.1

Utilization 96.8 95.9 84.8 80.3 85.9 93.4

Russia

Capacity – – – – – 4.0

Utilization – – – – – n.a.

Float Glass Auto Glass

Planned Facilities 2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017

China (all regions) 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 0.0 n.a.

Russia 0.0 0.0 450.0 0.0 8.1 n.a.

United States 150.0 150.0 0.0 12.1 0.0 n.a.

n.a. = not available

Note: Northern China included Beijing, Jilin, Shenyang, and Inner Mongolia; Central and Eastern China included Henan,
Hubei, and Shanghai; Southern China included Fujian and Guangdong; and Southwestern China included Chongqing.

Total commitment to the auto-class production facilities in Kaluga City, Russia, was approximately US$200 million. As of
December 31, 2014, Fuyao had invested approximately US$116 million. Fuyao expected to use the funds raised from its
global offering (approximately 785.2 million) for the second phase of construction of the auto-glass production facility.
Fuyao planned to construct an auto-glass grade float-glass production facility with annual capacity of approximately 450,000
tonnes near its Russian auto-glass production facility. The construction was expected to start in 2016, to be completed by
the end of 2017. An amount of 1.57 billion, raised from Fuyaos global offering, was expected to be used for the float-glass
facility.

Fuyao expected to use the approximately 1.83 billion raised from its global offering for i

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About Scholarfront Essay writing service

We are a professional paper writing website. If you have searched a question and bumped into our website just know you are in the right place to get help in your coursework. We offer HIGH QUALITY & PLAGIARISM FREE Papers.

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To make an Order you only need to click on “Order Now” and we will direct you to our Order Page. Fill Our Order Form with all your assignment instructions. Select your deadline and pay for your paper. You will get it few hours before your set deadline.

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